عبدالمطلب عبداله رهیافت انقلاب اسلامی 2980-9118 19 71 2025 08 23 The Role of Institutional Structures in Combating Corruption in Iran and China جایگاه ساختار های نهادی در مبارزه با فساد در ایران و چین 21 50 232057 FA ایمان رمضانی گروه علوم سیاسی، واحد نیشابور، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، نیشابور، ایران اهورا راهبر گروه علوم سیاسی، واحد نیشابور، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، نیشابور، ایران(نویسنده مسئول) حسین شریعتی گروه علوم سیاسی، واحد نیشابور، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، نیشابور، ایران Journal Article 2025 01 14 This article investigates the role and effectiveness of institutional structures in combating corruption in Iran and China, focusing on the relationship between political power, administrative organization, and accountability mechanisms. The study compares how two distinct political systems—an Islamic theocracy and a socialist one-party state—design, manage, and utilize institutional frameworks to control corruption. Employing a qualitative–comparative methodology and document analysis, the research explores the evolution, mandates, and performance of key anti-corruption institutions such as Iran’s Supreme Audit Court, the General Inspection Organization, and the Chinese Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI). Findings show that while both countries have established extensive institutional networks to monitor financial integrity and public service ethics, the degree of political autonomy and transparency within these structures determines their effectiveness. China’s centralized disciplinary system has achieved relative efficiency through internal party supervision and strong enforcement, whereas Iran’s fragmented oversight model—marked by overlapping authorities and limited inter-agency coordination—undermines accountability. The study concludes that genuine institutional reform requires strengthening independence, transparency, and the rule of law rather than merely expanding the number of anti-corruption agencies. Introduction Corruption remains one of the most persistent challenges undermining governance, public trust, and economic development worldwide. Its institutional dimension—the ability or failure of political systems to design and sustain mechanisms of control—is particularly significant in developing states. Iran and China, despite differing in ideology and political organization, both demonstrate long-standing struggles to regulate bureaucratic behavior and restrain abuse of power. In Iran, anti-corruption discourse has been central to political reform since the 1990s, culminating in the establishment of multiple supervisory bodies under the Constitution, such as the Supreme Audit Court (Divan-e Mohasebat), the General Inspection Organization (Sazman-e Bazresi Koli), and judicial anti-corruption task forces. In China, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) and later the National Supervisory Commission (NSC) have become pillars of the state’s anti-corruption regime.ذThe question guiding this study is: How do institutional structures in Iran and China differ in design and functionality when addressing corruption, and what factors determine their relative effectiveness? By comparing the two models, the research aims to uncover how institutional configuration, political culture, and administrative centralization shape anti-corruption outcomes. Materials and Methods This study adopts a qualitative comparative institutional analysis, drawing upon constitutional documents, legislative acts, and secondary sources in Persian, Chinese, and English. The research proceeds through three analytical layers: Structural layer – examination of organizational design, hierarchical authority, and coordination mechanisms between agencies; Functional layer – assessment of enforcement capacity, transparency, and accountability in practice; Contextual layer – consideration of political and cultural determinants, such as party dominance, judicial independence, and public participation. In the Iranian context, the research analyzes primary legal sources including Articles 55, 174, and 156 of the Constitution, as well as statutory documents defining the duties of the Supreme Audit Court and the General Inspection Organization. In the Chinese case, the focus is on institutional reforms initiated under Xi Jinping’s “Tigers and Flies” campaign (2013–present), the Supervision Law (2018), and party-state integration through the CCDI–NSC merger. The methodological framework combines documentary analysis with comparative institutionalism, allowing the researcher to assess how variations in institutional design lead to different enforcement outcomes despite similar goals of administrative integrity. Discussion The findings reveal that both Iran and China have developed broad institutional architectures for anti-corruption governance, yet they differ fundamentally in political logic and operational coherence. In China, the CCDI operates within the framework of party discipline, possessing investigative powers that transcend bureaucratic hierarchy. The institutional integration of the CCDI with the National Supervisory Commission (NSC) has established a unified chain of command under the Communist Party’s leadership. This vertical accountability, though politically centralized, has enabled consistent implementation of anti-corruption campaigns and rapid enforcement of sanctions. Public perception surveys conducted by Transparency International and domestic universities indicate improved bureaucratic compliance and deterrence of large-scale graft since 2013. By contrast, Iran’s anti-corruption architecture reflects a pluralistic but fragmented system, with multiple agencies overlapping in mandate and authority. The Supreme Audit Court monitors fiscal discipline within state accounts, the General Inspection Organization oversees legality in administrative conduct, and the Judiciary’s Special Anti-Corruption Task Forces handle prosecutorial enforcement. However, weak coordination, political interference, and limited access to data have constrained their performance. Iran’s legal framework, rooted in Article 174 of the Constitution, envisions broad supervisory powers, yet institutional autonomy is curtailed by political oversight from the judiciary and the executive. The absence of an integrated national anti-corruption database and limited whistleblower protection laws further restricts transparency. From a comparative governance perspective, China’s centralized institutionalization ensures decisiveness but risks politicization and lack of due process, while Iran’s decentralized approach provides formal independence but results in inefficiency. In both cases, institutional legitimacy depends on balancing enforcement with procedural fairness. A key distinction lies in institutional accountability: in China, disciplinary inspection reports directly to the party’s Central Committee, whereas in Iran, audit and inspection agencies report to Parliament and the judiciary, creating multiple, sometimes conflicting, accountability pathways. The study identifies three major determinants of institutional success: Coherence and clarity of mandates – China’s unified disciplinary system contrasts with Iran’s overlapping agencies; Transparency and data integration – centralized monitoring in China enables real-time supervision; Public participation and legal safeguards – Iran’s lack of systematic citizen oversight and press freedom limits social accountability. Ultimately, both systems confront the same dilemma: how to institutionalize control without undermining political stability. While China’s party-based model emphasizes deterrence through hierarchical discipline, Iran’s model remains caught between legal pluralism and bureaucratic inertia. Conclusion The comparative analysis concludes that the effectiveness of anti-corruption institutions depends less on the number of agencies and more on the integrity of institutional design—clarity of authority, operational independence, and legal accountability. China’s anti-corruption institutions demonstrate relative efficiency due to centralized leadership, consistent policy enforcement, and a culture of bureaucratic discipline embedded within party structures. However, their dependence on political will and limited judicial oversight poses challenges to sustainability and fairness. Iran’s framework, although grounded in constitutional oversight and Islamic ethics, suffers from structural fragmentation and limited inter-agency coordination. Genuine reform requires integrating supervisory systems under a coherent national strategy, enhancing data transparency, and guaranteeing the independence of oversight institutions from political influence. The study underscores that institutional reform must be accompanied by normative change—a shift from reactive punishment to preventive governance emphasizing transparency, civic participation, and legal education. By comparing Iran and China, the article contributes to broader debates on governance reform in hybrid regimes, illustrating how institutional architecture mediates the relationship between power, accountability, and justice. Ultimately, sustainable anti-corruption efforts require not only robust institutions but also a culture of responsibility grounded in ethical governance and the rule of law. نهادها نقشی اساسی در شکل‌گیری و اجرای سیاست‌های ضد فساد دارند. میزان استقلال، هماهنگی و کارآمدی نهادهای نظارتی می‌تواند تأثیر مستقیمی بر موفقیت یا ناکامی کشورها در مقابله با فساد داشته باشد. این مقاله به بررسی جایگاه ساختارهای نهادی در مبارزه با فساد در دو کشور ایران و چین می‌پردازد. سؤال اصلی این است که چگونه ساختارهای نهادی در ایران و چین بر مبارزه با فساد تأثیرگذار هستند؟ فرضیه اصلی این است که ساختار حکمرانی متمرکز در چین، با وجود هماهنگی بیشتر بین نهادها، موفقیت‌های بیشتری در مبارزه با فساد کسب کرده است، در حالی که ساختار پیچیده و غیرمتمرکز در ایران، همراه با تضادهای نهادی و فساد گسترده، مانع از اجرای مؤثر سیاست‌های ضد فساد شده است. پژوهش با استفاده از روش توصیفی-تحلیلی، داده‌های بین‌المللی از منابعی همچون بانک جهانی و سازمان شفافیت بین‌المللی را تحلیل کرده است. نتایج نشان می‌دهد که چین به دلیل تمرکز نهادی و برخورد قاطع‌تر با فساد، توانسته است بهبود نسبی در کنترل فساد ایجاد کند، در حالی که در ایران، پیچیدگی نهادی و ضعف نظارتی از موانع اصلی در پیشبرد سیاست‌های ضد فساد بوده است.

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