https://www.rahyaftjournal.ir/ The Islamic Revolution Approach en daily 1 Sat, 20 Dec 2025 00:00:00 +0330 Sat, 20 Dec 2025 00:00:00 +0330 https://www.rahyaftjournal.ir/article_238000.html Scientific diplomacy has increasingly emerged as a strategic instrument of soft power in contemporary international relations. This article examines scientific diplomacy as a potential future axis of the soft power of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The main research question asks how scientific diplomacy can evolve into a central pillar of Iran’s regional soft power and what alternative future scenarios can be envisioned for its development. Using a qualitative and futures-oriented approach, the study applies trend analysis and James Dator’s four futures framework to explore possible trajectories. The findings indicate that Iran’s scientific diplomacy faces four plausible scenarios: continued growth, collapse, re-creation, and fundamental transformation. The preferred scenario combines sustained growth with adaptive re-creation, supported by strategic investment in emerging technologies and regional scientific cooperation. Such a pathway could enhance Iran’s regional legitimacy, generate positive scientific interdependencies, and consolidate its position within the regional architecture of soft power.   IntroductionThe contemporary international system has undergone profound transformations in the nature and sources of power. Power is no longer derived solely from military capabilities or economic resources; intangible elements such as knowledge, culture, legitimacy, and technology now play a decisive role. Within this evolving context, soft power has become a central concept in foreign policy analysis, emphasizing attraction rather than coercion. Scientific diplomacy has emerged as one of the most dynamic instruments of soft power, linking scientific cooperation, technological exchange, and elite networking with broader diplomatic objectives. For the Islamic Republic of Iran, scientific diplomacy offers a particularly significant opportunity. Iran possesses notable scientific and technological capacities in areas such as nanotechnology, biotechnology, medicine, aerospace, and unmanned aerial systems. At the same time, the country faces structural challenges including international sanctions, restricted academic collaboration, and brain drain. These conditions make it essential to adopt a forward-looking analytical framework capable of identifying both opportunities and risks. This study addresses the central question of how scientific diplomacy can become the future axis of Iran’s soft power and what scenarios may shape its evolution in the coming years. Materials and Methods This research employs a qualitative and futures-oriented methodology. Data were collected through library and documentary research, including academic literature on soft power, smart power, scientific diplomacy, and Iranian foreign policy, as well as policy documents and analytical reports. The study integrates two complementary analytical tools. First, it draws on the concept of smart power, which emphasizes the strategic combination of hard and soft power resources. Within this framework, scientific diplomacy is understood as a bridge between technological capability and cultural–ideational attraction. Second, the study applies futures studies methods, particularly trend analysis and James Dator’s four futures framework. This model conceptualizes the future as a set of alternative pathways rather than a single linear trajectory, consisting of continued growth, collapse, re-creation, and fundamental transformation. By identifying key trends, drivers, and uncertainties, the research constructs plausible scenarios for the future of Iran’s scientific diplomacy. Discussion Trend analysis reveals several structural forces shaping Iran’s scientific diplomacy. On the global level, the internationalization of science and the expansion of transnational research networks have increased the political significance of knowledge production. Scientific achievement now functions as a marker of credibility and legitimacy in regional and global arenas. Concurrently, intensified technological competition among major powers has transformed science and innovation into strategic assets. Regionally, the Middle East has witnessed growing investment in higher education, research infrastructure, and knowledge-based branding, particularly by countries such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. This has generated a competitive environment in which scientific diplomacy plays a key role in shaping regional influence. Iran’s scientific achievements position it as a potential regional hub, yet sanctions and institutional fragmentation limit its ability to fully capitalize on these assets. Based on these trends, four scenarios are identified. In the continued growth scenario, Iran sustains its current trajectory of scientific development, expands international academic cooperation, and strengthens its reputation as a knowledge-producing country. In the collapse scenario, intensified sanctions, academic isolation, and accelerated brain drain undermine scientific capacity and erode Iran’s soft power. The re-creation scenario envisions a strategic reorientation toward regional and South–South scientific cooperation, transforming constraints into opportunities for indigenous innovation and regional leadership. Finally, the fundamental transformation scenario assumes that breakthroughs in emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence or advanced biotechnology, fundamentally reshape Iran’s scientific diplomacy and blur the boundary between soft and hard power. Conclusion The study concludes that the future of Iran’s scientific diplomacy is inherently non-linear and contingent upon strategic choices and external conditions. Among the four scenarios, the preferred pathway combines elements of continued growth and re-creation, with selective aspects of fundamental transformation. In this scenario, Iran maintains scientific momentum, reconfigures its diplomatic networks toward regional and Islamic partners, and invests strategically in emerging technologies. Such an approach would enhance Iran’s regional legitimacy, create positive scientific interdependencies, and reinforce its image as a reliable scientific partner. More broadly, the findings demonstrate that scientific diplomacy should not be treated as a peripheral policy tool but as a central pillar of Iran’s soft power strategy. Effective coordination among scientific institutions, diplomatic bodies, and technological sectors is essential for translating scientific capacity into sustainable soft power and long-term regional influence.     https://www.rahyaftjournal.ir/article_238001.html This study analyzes the structural failures of urban governance policy-making in the Islamic Republic of Iran with a focus on official upper-level policy documents. The main research question examines what the key weaknesses of urban policy-making in Iran are and how they can be identified through document-based analysis. The study hypothesizes that excessive centralization, institutional fragmentation, dominance of physical-oriented development discourse, lack of evaluation mechanisms, limited definition of urban functions, and internal policy contradictions have produced persistent policy failures. The research employs a directed qualitative content analysis method grounded in complexity systems theory and document-based policy analysis. Ten major national policy documents related to urban management were selected through purposive sampling. The findings reveal that Iran’s urban policy framework lacks institutional coherence, conceptual clarity, and adaptive capacity, indicating the need for fundamental restructuring at conceptual, institutional, and operational levels. IntroductionUrban areas represent the most complex form of human settlement, functioning not only as physical spaces but also as arenas of political decision-making, social interaction, and economic production. In contemporary governance debates, urban management is no longer perceived merely as a technical or service-oriented activity, but rather as a core component of national governance systems. Effective urban policy-making requires multi-level coordination, institutional flexibility, and adaptive mechanisms capable of responding to social, environmental, and economic complexity. In Iran, despite the existence of numerous upper-level policy documents governing urban affairs, urban management continues to suffer from fragmentation, inefficiency, and limited responsiveness. This study seeks to identify and analyze the structural policy failures embedded within these documents. Materials and Methods The research adopts a qualitative, applied, and analytical design. The primary methodological approach is directed qualitative content analysis, as developed by Hsieh and Shannon, which allows theoretical concepts to guide the coding process while remaining open to emergent themes from the data. The theoretical framework integrates complexity systems theory and structural functionalism in policy analysis. Complexity theory conceptualizes cities as dynamic, non-linear systems characterized by interdependence, feedback loops, and emergent outcomes, while structural functionalism highlights the roles and functions of institutions within governance systems. The empirical material consists of ten major upper-level policy documents related to urban management in Iran, including national development plans, urban policy guidelines, spatial planning documents, and key legal frameworks governing municipalities and city councils. These documents were selected through purposive sampling based on their legal authority, policy relevance, and scope of influence. Units of analysis included policy objectives, institutional roles, coordination mechanisms, evaluation provisions, and governance discourse. Coding was conducted through a combination of pre-defined theoretical categories and inductively derived sub-themes, followed by thematic aggregation. DiscussionThe analysis reveals multiple layers of policy failure within Iran’s urban governance framework. First, excessive centralization of authority limits the strategic autonomy of municipalities and city councils, reducing their capacity to respond to local needs. Despite rhetorical support for decentralization, upper-level documents fail to specify enforceable mechanisms for power delegation. Second, institutional coordination remains weak, as policy documents lack clear frameworks for horizontal and vertical collaboration among governmental bodies, resulting in overlapping responsibilities and administrative inefficiency. Third, the dominant discourse of urban development remains largely physical and infrastructure-oriented, marginalizing social, cultural, environmental, and participatory dimensions of urban life. Concepts such as social justice, urban resilience, and citizen participation appear inconsistently and without operational clarity. Fourth, the absence of systematic policy evaluation and feedback mechanisms prevents institutional learning. Most documents articulate long-term objectives without defining measurable indicators, monitoring bodies, or revision cycles. Fifth, urban functions are narrowly defined, reducing municipalities to service providers rather than comprehensive governance institutions responsible for social welfare, cultural development, and economic innovation. Finally, internal contradictions among policy documents undermine strategic coherence, as competing mandates regarding decentralization, financial autonomy, and administrative control coexist without reconciliation. From a complexity perspective, these failures reflect a governance system unable to manage interdependencies, adapt to environmental feedback, or support self-organization at the local level. ConclusionThe study concludes that urban policy-making in Iran suffers from deep structural and conceptual deficiencies rooted in centralized governance, fragmented institutional design, and outdated development paradigms. Upper-level policy documents, rather than enabling adaptive urban governance, reproduce rigidity and policy incoherence. Addressing these failures requires a fundamental shift toward a national urban strategy grounded in multi-level governance, institutional coordination, participatory policy design, and continuous evaluation. Without such transformation, urban governance in Iran will remain ill-equipped to address the complex challenges of contemporary urbanization.   https://www.rahyaftjournal.ir/article_238008.html This article examines the feasibility study of employing non-Shiite officials in the Islamic Republic of Iran based on the principles of the Constitution and higher-level documents. The purpose of the research is to analyze the rights of religious minorities in the system of the Islamic Republic of Iran and identify legal and executive obstacles to their effective participation in the government structure. The research method is analytical-descriptive, which uses various principles of the Constitution, especially principles related to legal equality, freedom of employment, and citizenship rights, to examine the feasibility study of the presence of religious minorities in executive and political positions in the country. The results of the research show that the principles of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, including principles 19, 20, 28, and 64, are the legal and executive support for the realization of employing non-Shiite officials at various levels of government. These principles emphasize the legal equality of all citizens and guarantee the freedom to choose a job and participate in social and economic activities for all individuals. The constitution also provides for the presence of representatives of religious minorities in the Islamic Consultative Assembly and establishes their participation in the country’s major decision-making process. However, in practice, there may be social and cultural barriers to greater representation of minorities in executive positions. It is suggested that in order to achieve effective participation of religious minorities, reforms in executive policies and processes, such as the establishment of special deputies and a non-Shiite assembly of representatives in the Assembly, be considered to provide a basis for interaction and convergence between minorities and the majority.   Theoretical Framework The Constitution outlines the relationship between citizens and the political system, focusing on equality, justice, and the rights and duties of individuals. To understand principles such as equality and citizens' rights, one must refer to the Constitution (Gorji Azandariani, 2017). Religious, ethnic, and sectarian minorities' rights play a crucial role in either enabling or hindering their participation in public and private employment. Specifically, the Constitution acknowledges religious minorities, including Zoroastrians, Jews, and Christians, as well as Sunni Muslims and various sects, and outlines their rights in Articles 15, 19, and 20. These articles ensure equality by negating superiority based on race, color, language, or similar factors (Qasemi, 2003). In theory, the Constitution emphasizes the rights of all citizens without special considerations, but the application of these principles to non-Shia groups highlights either barriers to their full participation or the absence of adequate measures to ensure their inclusion in key political positions.   Findings The research findings indicate that the appointment of Shia officials in the Islamic Republic of Iran is both possible and desirable based on the Constitution. The Constitution does not present any exceptions for favoring Shia over non-Shia citizens in areas such as "citizens' rights," "the right to have representatives," "political freedom and participation," "equality and justice," and "the right to work and choose a suitable profession." Therefore, the idea of positive discrimination or granting specific rights to religious minorities in Iran is undesirable and even undermines the cohesion of minority groups and national identity. However, to improve the status of non-Shia groups, it is necessary to implement constitutional provisions, utilize the talents of non-Shia elites at the ministerial level, deputy ministers, governors, and military commanders, and revitalize religious offices at the presidential level. Conclusion The study shows that the appointment of non-Shia officials in the Islamic Republic of Iran is not about introducing positive discrimination or considering religious minorities as "special" groups. Rather, it is about acknowledging the principles enshrined in the Constitution, such as freedom of participation, equality, justice, the right to work, and freedom of occupation. These principles explicitly call for equality without privileging any specific group, thereby negating the need for positive discrimination or special conditions for religious minorities. This is because the Constitution already contains favorable conditions for the inclusion of non-Shia officials in the political structure of Iran. Therefore, a significant part of improving their status requires the participation of religious minorities based on constitutional principles, which can elevate their status through "citizens' rights" and "freedom of occupation." Practically, the recognition of citizens' rights, including the right to have a representative in Parliament, should translate into tangible political actions. Establishing a special office for religious minorities at the presidential level would eliminate the perception of ethnic or religious identity as a separate category and instead consider them integral members of the Iranian nation. With this perspective, the inclusion and participation of non-Shia groups would provide a means for their effective contribution to political and social spheres, fostering greater interaction and national cohesion. The right to have representatives in the Iranian Parliament should become a tangible political action that reflects the framework of the Constitution, ensuring that the rights of non-Shia citizens are fully represented. Therefore, the suggestions presented here underscore that collective action at legislative and executive levels, supported by the Constitution and other existing laws, plays a key role in improving the status of non-Shia citizens, enabling them to exercise their rights to work and freedom of action within the Islamic society, and avoiding abstract and unsupported ideas such as positive discrimination. These ideas could undermine national identity and may lead to some illegal activities within the Islamic Republic of Iran.   https://www.rahyaftjournal.ir/article_238009.html Child labor in Iran represents a serious violation of children’s rights and reflects a complex interaction between structural poverty, fragmented institutional power, and punitive approaches to social problems. This article aims to analyze how the interplay of these three dimensions contributes to the reproduction and persistence of child labor in Iran. The main research question asks how poverty, institutional weakness, and penal policy interact to criminalize working children rather than protect them. Using a directed qualitative content analysis of 17 academic articles and policy reports, the study argues that coercive and security-oriented responses, combined with multidimensional household poverty and lack of institutional coordination, reinforce cycles of marginalization and exclusion. The findings reveal that unstable economic policies, fragmented welfare institutions, and the securitization of child labor are key obstacles to addressing this social crisis, underscoring the need for a shift toward social, rights-based, and preventive approaches.   Introduction Child labor constitutes one of the most critical social problems in contemporary Iran and reflects deeper structural failures in social policy, economic governance, and institutional coordination. Beyond the immediate violation of children’s rights, the persistence of child labor raises broader concerns regarding social justice, sustainable development, and the legitimacy of public policy. Despite the existence of legal prohibitions and Iran’s accession to international instruments such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the prevalence of child labor has not declined and, in some contexts, has intensified. This study departs from approaches that treat child labor merely as an outcome of household poverty or cultural factors. Instead, it conceptualizes child labor as a socially produced phenomenon shaped by the interaction of poverty, institutional power, and penal policy. The central research question is how this interaction leads to the criminalization and marginalization of working children rather than their protection. The study argues that child labor in Iran is reproduced through structural inequalities, fragmented governance, and coercive state responses that prioritize public order over child welfare.   Materials and Methods The research adopts a qualitative, interpretive methodology based on directed content analysis. Seventeen academic articles, policy studies, and official and semi-official reports published between 2001 and 2024 were selected through theoretical sampling. Sources were drawn from Iranian academic databases and institutional publications related to child labor, social welfare, criminal justice, and public policy. The analytical framework integrates three complementary perspectives: labeling theory to examine how working children are constructed as deviant subjects; Bourdieu’s theory of social reproduction to analyze structural inequality and symbolic violence; and critical public policy theory to assess how social problems are framed and governed. Coding was conducted in several stages, including open coding, axial categorization, and thematic synthesis aligned with the three core dimensions of poverty, institutional power, and penal policy. Validity was enhanced through iterative comparison between theory and data, while transparency was ensured by systematic documentation of the coding process.   Discussion The findings demonstrate that poverty in Iran operates as a multidimensional condition encompassing income insecurity, lack of access to education, health services, housing, and social protection. In the absence of effective welfare mechanisms, families often rely on children’s labor as a survival strategy. Rather than addressing these structural drivers, state responses frequently focus on visible manifestations of poverty, particularly street-based child labor. Institutional analysis reveals significant fragmentation and lack of coordination among welfare agencies, municipalities, law enforcement bodies, and judicial institutions. No single authority bears clear responsibility for child labor, resulting in inconsistent policies, overlapping mandates, and gaps in protection. Civil society organizations, although often more effective in engaging with children and families, operate under restrictive conditions and limited support. Penal policy further exacerbates these dynamics. Children engaged in labor are frequently subjected to policing, detention, and removal under the guise of urban order or crime prevention. Such practices reinforce labeling processes, expose children to symbolic and physical violence, and undermine trust in public institutions. Instead of functioning as protective mechanisms, penal interventions contribute to the reproduction of exclusion and vulnerability.   Conclusion This study concludes that child labor in Iran cannot be effectively addressed through punitive or fragmented approaches. The criminalization of working children reflects deeper structural failures rooted in poverty, weak institutional coordination, and security-oriented governance. Sustainable solutions require a paradigm shift toward integrated social policies that prioritize child welfare, institutional accountability, and rights-based interventions. Replacing penal responses with preventive, participatory, and welfare-oriented strategies is essential for breaking the cycle of poverty, exclusion, and criminalization that currently defines the experience of child labor in Iran.   https://www.rahyaftjournal.ir/article_238010.html This article aimed to investigate the relationship between national identity and national pride with the mediation of hope for specific domains of political science students. Five hypotheses were proposed according to the model. In terms of the nature of the method, the present study is a descriptive research and in terms of the method, it is also in the category of correlational studies. The statistical population of the present study was undergraduate political science students at the University of Mazandaran. In this study, 139 undergraduate political science students (47 male students and 92 female students) participated in this study. They were selected through stratified sampling and responded to three standard questionnaires: Eidi et al. (2014), Simpson's (1999) Adult Hope for Specific Domains, and Rabbani and Rastegar's (2013) National Identity Questionnaire. The results showed that the standard beta value of the path from national identity to hope for specific domains of students was not significant at the (p‹0.01) level. The standard beta of the path from national identity to national pride of political science students and the standard beta of the path of hope in specific areas to national pride of political science students were significant at the (p‹0/01) level. Also, according to the results of the indirect effect, it can be seen that hope in specific areas did not play a mediating role in the relationship between national identity and national pride of students. According to the results, it is suggested that in order to improve the national pride of political science students, the level of national identity and hope should be increased.   introduction National pride is considered by social scientists as an important phenomenon in comparative politics and comparative economics. A review of the research literature shows that the hope variable can have a mediating role in the relationship between national identity and national pride. Some researchers examined the relationship between national identity and psychological well-being in European countries and found that, while it is moderated by national pride, higher levels of national identity reduce happiness, but lower levels of national identity enhance happiness. Given the importance of the national pride variable and the examination of important variables related to it, this study seeks to examine the relationship between national identity and national pride by considering the mediating role of hope in specific areas of political science students.   Materials and Methods  The research method is descriptive in nature and correlational in method. The statistical population consists of undergraduate political science students at Mazandaran University, who were studying in the academic year 1400-1399, and there were about 500 students in the undergraduate course. The purpose of selecting political science students is to have political awareness and subject mastery of the component of national identity and solidarity. Political science, sometimes called political science, is a social science that deals with governance systems and the analysis of political activities, political thoughts, and the constitution related to political behavior. In this study, about 180 questionnaires were distributed, and ultimately the information of 139 students was deemed valid. 139 undergraduate students of political science (47 male and 92 female) from Mazandaran University participated and were selected through stratified sampling method. The classes included first-year students, second-year students, third-year students, and fourth-year students. All sample students responded to three standard national pride questionnaires: to measure national pride, the National Pride Questionnaire developed by Eidi et al. (2014), the 40-item Adult Domain-specific Hope Scale (DSHS) by Simpson (1999), and the National Identity Questionnaire by Rabbani and Rastegar. (2013).   Discussion The results show that standard beta of the path from national identity to national pride of political science students is significant at two levels (p‹0.05) and (p‹0.01) (T=3.23; β=0.18). Also, the standard beta of the path from hope for specific areas to national pride of political science students (third hypothesis of the research) is significant at two levels (p‹0.05) and (p‹0.01) (T=4.21; β=0.35). In the indirect effects section, the standard beta of the path from national identity to hope for specific areas of political science students at two levels (p‹0.05) and (p‹0.01) is not significant (T=0.67; β=0.01). According to the results of the indirect effect, it can be seen that hope for specific areas did not play a mediating role in the relationship between national identity and national pride of students. In the total effects section, the standard beta of the path from national identity to hope for specific areas of students at two levels (p‹0.05) and (p‹0.01) is not significant (T=1.95; β=0.07). The standard beta of the path from national identity to national pride of political science students at two levels (p‹0.05) and (p‹0.01) is significant (T=3.23; β=0.18). Also, the standard beta value of the path of hope for specific areas of students to national pride of political science students (the third hypothesis of the research) is significant at two levels (p‹0.05) and (p‹0.01) (T=4.21; β=0.35).   Conclusion The results of the research analysis showed that the causal relationship between national identity and hope in specific domains of political science students is not significant. To theoretically explain the results, it should be said that national identity can have complex effects on the level of hope in a society. The results showed that the relationship between national identity and national pride of political science students was significant. To explain these results theoretically, it should be said that political science students will feel proud of their nation's ability in the form of national identity by knowing and being aware of their nation's past and history, and their national pride is influenced by their understanding of national identity. Other results of the study also showed that the hopefulness of specific domains did not play a mediating role in the relationship between national identity and national pride of students. The results of this part of the study are also somewhat consistent with the results of some studies. Although it seems reasonable that national satisfaction is generally related to hopefulness and that the two types of national identity, specific domain and general, which are inseparable and at the same time distinct from each other, affect hopefulness. The key concepts, namely national identity and hopefulness, are particularly related to the specific context, so the relationship between national identity and hopefulness apparently varies across nations and cultures. However, it is important to note that the relationship between national pride and hopefulness of specific domains is not always simple and direct. Other factors such as economic and social conditions, historical events, political system, etc. can also affect this relationship, the economic and social conditions of a country can affect the level of national pride and hopefulness of specific domains.     https://www.rahyaftjournal.ir/article_238011.html The expansion of Salafi-jihadist groups in Central Asia has emerged alongside the growth of various Islamist movements in the region and is rooted in a combination of political instability, socio-economic deprivation, weak governance, and external interventions. This article aims to analyze the causes of Salafi-jihadist presence in Central Asia and examine its implications for the national security of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Employing a descriptive-analytical method within a constructivist theoretical framework, the study argues that the interaction of fragile identities, normative governance failures, and transnational ideological networks has facilitated the organization and spread of Salafi-jihadist groups. The findings indicate that the impact of these groups on Iran’s national security is multidimensional, affecting political, economic, and cultural domains through both material and ideational mechanisms.   Introduction Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Central Asia has undergone profound political, social, and ideological transformations. The newly independent republics faced simultaneous challenges of state-building, economic transition, and identity formation. Within this context, various Islamic movements re-emerged, some of which gradually evolved into radical and violent forms. Among them, Salafi-jihadist groups have gained particular prominence, not only as local security threats but also as transnational actors embedded in global jihadist networks. For the Islamic Republic of Iran, Central Asia constitutes a strategically significant peripheral region due to geographic proximity, historical and cultural ties, and shared security concerns. The growing presence of Salafi-jihadist actors in this region raises important questions regarding Iran’s national security, particularly in political, economic, and cultural dimensions. Existing studies often approach this phenomenon through materialist or security-centric lenses, emphasizing poverty, repression, or foreign intervention. While these factors are important, such approaches remain insufficient to explain how radical ideologies gain legitimacy and why their impact extends beyond direct military threats. This study adopts a constructivist perspective to address the following question: What are the underlying causes of Salafi-jihadist presence in Central Asia, and how does this phenomenon affect the national security of the Islamic Republic of Iran? The central argument is that Salafi-jihadism in Central Asia is not merely a reaction to material conditions but a socially constructed outcome of identity crises, normative breakdowns, and competing regional discourses.   Materials and Methods The research employs a descriptive-analytical methodology based on qualitative analysis of academic literature, policy documents, and secondary sources related to Central Asia, Salafi-jihadism, and Iranian foreign and security policy. Data were collected through library and documentary research, including scholarly books, peer-reviewed articles, and authoritative analytical reports. The theoretical framework of the study is constructivism in international relations, which emphasizes the role of identities, norms, and intersubjective meanings in shaping political behavior. Key concepts such as identity formation, the social construction of anarchy, and the mutual constitution of agents and structures guide the analysis. Rather than treating security threats as objective and fixed, this approach allows for an examination of how Salafi-jihadist groups are produced, legitimized, and perceived within specific social and political contexts, and how these perceptions influence Iran’s security environment.   Discussion From a constructivist standpoint, the rise of Salafi-jihadist groups in Central Asia reflects deep identity vacuums created after the Soviet collapse. Weak national narratives, limited political inclusion, and authoritarian governance models undermined state legitimacy and facilitated the appeal of alternative transnational identities. Salafi-jihadism provided a simplified, absolutist framework that offered meaning, belonging, and moral clarity to marginalized individuals and groups. These dynamics were reinforced by external influences, including transnational jihadist networks and ideological support from actors outside the region. Such interactions demonstrate the agent–structure relationship emphasized by constructivism: Salafi-jihadist groups emerge from fragile normative structures while simultaneously reproducing instability through violence and radical discourse. For Iran, the implications extend beyond direct security threats. Politically, the spread of Salafi-jihadism contributes to unfavorable perceptions of political Islam in Central Asia, indirectly affecting Iran’s regional image and diplomatic engagement. Economically, insecurity and instability reduce trust and hinder long-term cooperation, trade, and connectivity projects involving Iran. Culturally, Salafi-jihadist narratives challenge Iran’s religious and civilizational influence by promoting exclusionary interpretations of Islam that foster sectarian suspicion. Thus, the impact on Iran’s national security is multidimensional, operating through both material channels, such as instability and weakened cooperation, and ideational channels, including identity contestation and normative marginalization.   Conclusion This study demonstrates that Salafi-jihadist presence in Central Asia cannot be adequately understood through purely material or security-oriented explanations. A constructivist analysis reveals that identity crises, normative governance failures, and transnational ideological interactions play a decisive role in the emergence and persistence of these groups. The findings indicate that the consequences for the national security of the Islamic Republic of Iran are indirect yet significant, affecting political relations, economic opportunities, and cultural influence. Addressing these challenges requires moving beyond reactive security measures toward strategies that emphasize regional norm-building, identity dialogue, and cooperative frameworks aimed at reducing ideological polarization. By recognizing the socially constructed nature of radicalization and insecurity, Iran and regional actors may better mitigate the long-term risks posed by Salafi-jihadism in Central Asia.   https://www.rahyaftjournal.ir/article_238012.html Crimes against national security are recognized as political and security offenses in many countries, with severe penalties imposed for them. This research aims to examine the approaches to combating crimes against national security in Iran and the USA, and to analyze the interaction or conflict of these approaches with international laws and regulations. The research methodology employed in this study is qualitative, using a comparative and analytical approach. The results indicate that in both countries, legislative and executive approaches tend to prioritize state security over citizens’ rights. In the USA, following the events of September 11, terrorism has been regarded as a serious threat, leading to many national security laws that facilitate broader government intervention in security matters and address both foreign and domestic threats. Similarly, in the Islamic Republic of Iran, the predominance of the idea of maintaining the regime reveals a comparable stance on national security measures. Despite legal differences, there is a noticeable emphasis on prioritizing security over individual rights in both countries. Some national security laws in both nations consider individuals or groups as guilty of crimes against national security merely based on suspicion. Security concerns resulting from terrorist threats in the USA and the extension of the political idea of regime preservation to the legal arena in the Islamic Republic of Iran have led to specific approaches in both countries that are not necessarily aligned with international law’s principles regarding individual freedoms. Therefore, it is essential for both legal systems to define crimes against national security more transparently and specifically within the framework of international rules.   IntroductionCrimes against national security are specific crimes that threaten and target the values related to security in a society, or those that lead to the destabilization and destruction of the society's security values (Koushki & Alizadeh Seresht, 2015: 107). Therefore, crimes against national security specifically refer to crimes that endanger the existence of a government, covering a range of violations, including criticism of the political system, street protests, armed resistance, or sabotage in public and government facilities. However, in any case, the commission of crimes against national security ultimately means the elimination, exclusion, and marginalization of citizens to varying degrees, justified both morally and contractually. Morally, citizens who refuse to accept their moral duties, as well as those who disregard social contracts and obligations, are considered offenders (Mahmoudi Janki & Emami Arandi, 2013: 169). In this regard, the present study aims to examine the approaches to combating crimes against national security in the laws of the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran, in light of international law rules and regulations. Methods and Materials The methodology of this article is descriptive-analytical, and it employs a comparative approach. The data used in the article was collected through documentary and library methods, and the analysis was carried out through an inferential and comparative approach. DiscussionThe approach to combating crimes against national security in the U.S. has been influenced by the special circumstances that followed the September 11 attacks, during which the increasing fear of terrorism among American citizens, as well as daily emotional news and analyses, and media and political campaigns, have been significant in the enforcement of these crimes (Best, 2018: 16). Some have linked this fear and threat to concerns about the future security of the country and peaceful living for American citizens (Furedi, 2018: 65). In the Islamic Republic of Iran, however, the jurisprudential approach to social and political issues has led to prioritizing security over the freedom of citizens, considering the right to security as more important than achieving other fundamental freedoms of citizens. This approach reflects a stronger connection between national security and regime preservation, rather than between national security and citizens' rights and freedoms (Alipour & Kargari, 2010: 48). The prevailing legal approach in Iran, from the perspective of preserving the regime (Taghavi, 1999: 60), leads to the prioritization of security over freedom and places other citizens' rights in a secondary position. ConclusionThe results indicate that in both Iran and the U.S., legislative and executive approaches tend to prioritize state security over citizens' rights. In the U.S., following the September 11 attacks, terrorism has been considered a serious threat, and many national security laws lead to greater state intervention in security matters and dealing with both domestic and foreign threats. In the Islamic Republic of Iran, due to the predominance of the idea of regime preservation, a similar approach is observed regarding anti-national security measures. Despite legal differences, both countries emphasize the precedence of security over individual rights. Moreover, some national security laws in both countries consider individuals or groups suspected merely of being a threat to national security as perpetrators. Security concerns arising from terrorist threats in the U.S. and the extension of the political idea of regime preservation to the legal domain in Iran have led to specific approaches in both countries, which are not necessarily aligned with international law forms regarding individual freedoms. Therefore, it is essential that in both legal systems, crimes against national security be more clearly defined and applied in accordance with international law standards. https://www.rahyaftjournal.ir/article_238013.html This article examines the institutional transformation of the Iranian judiciary by comparing its independence and accountability mechanisms before and after the 1989 constitutional revision. The pre-revision model was based on a collective leadership structure centered on the Supreme Judicial Council, while the post-revision arrangement introduced a centralized leadership under the Head of the Judiciary. The main research question explores whether managerial centralization has enhanced accountability and administrative efficiency without undermining judicial independence in adjudication. The study hypothesizes that centralized leadership improves decision-making speed, coordination, and responsibility attribution, but only becomes substantively accountable when accompanied by data-based transparency and regular public reporting. Using a qualitative institutional analysis and thematic coding of constitutional texts, legislative debates, and interpretive documents, the findings show that post-1989 reforms strengthened administrative coherence and responsibility attribution, yet persistent gaps in performance indicators—such as case duration, publication of judgments, and review rates—limit the realization of measurable accountability.   IntroductionThe balance between judicial independence and institutional accountability represents one of the central challenges of constitutional governance. In judicial systems, independence safeguards the integrity of adjudication, while accountability ensures that judicial administration remains transparent, efficient, and responsive to public interests. In the Islamic Republic of Iran, this balance has been shaped by a significant institutional shift following the 1989 constitutional revision. The original 1979 Constitution established a collective leadership model for the judiciary through the Supreme Judicial Council, designed to prevent the concentration of power and to promote consultative decision-making. However, practical experience during the 1980s revealed structural limitations, particularly in coordination, responsibility attribution, and administrative efficiency. The 1989 revision replaced this model with a centralized leadership structure under a single Head of the Judiciary. This article investigates whether this transformation succeeded in reconciling independence and accountability more effectively than the previous arrangement.   Materials and Methods The study adopts a qualitative institutional and historical-legal methodology. Primary sources include the text of the Iranian Constitution before and after the 1989 revision, official records of the Assembly of Experts’ debates in 1979 and the Constitutional Revision Council in 1989, and interpretive opinions issued by relevant constitutional bodies. Secondary sources consist of scholarly works on judicial governance, accountability, and Islamic legal theory. Data were analyzed through thematic coding—open, axial, and selective—to identify recurring patterns related to leadership structure, accountability mechanisms, administrative coordination, and safeguards of adjudicative independence. The analysis is guided by a conceptual distinction between “independence in adjudication” and “accountability in administration,” allowing for a nuanced assessment of institutional design.   DiscussionThe findings indicate that the pre-1989 collective leadership model prioritized normative safeguards against personal concentration of power and symbolically reinforced judicial independence. However, this structure generated practical challenges. Decision-making processes were often slow due to multiple centers of authority, and responsibility for administrative outcomes was diffused. The absence of systematic performance indicators—such as standardized data on case backlog, duration of proceedings, and publication of judgments—further limited public and institutional accountability. As a result, accountability remained largely internal and procedural rather than measurable and socially visible. The post-1989 centralized leadership model addressed many of these shortcomings by establishing a clear focal point for decision-making and responsibility attribution. Centralization enhanced administrative coordination, facilitated inter-branch communication, and enabled more coherent policy implementation in areas such as human resources, judicial training, and organizational restructuring. Importantly, constitutional texts and interpretive materials consistently emphasized that this concentration of administrative authority should not extend into the substance of judicial reasoning or adjudication. The Supreme Court’s role in ensuring uniformity of jurisprudence and legality of decisions was preserved as a key safeguard of judicial independence. Nevertheless, the analysis also reveals persistent challenges. While centralization created the potential for measurable accountability, this potential has not been fully realized. The absence of institutionalized data transparency—regular publication of performance indicators, case-processing statistics, and accessible judgments—has limited the transformation of centralized authority into accountable governance. Without systematic reporting and standardized metrics, accountability risks becoming symbolic rather than substantive, and centralization may inadvertently heighten concerns about administrative overreach.   ConclusionThe comparative analysis demonstrates that neither the pre-1989 collective model nor the post-1989 centralized model offers a complete solution in isolation. The collective model effectively constrained personal power but suffered from fragmented accountability and administrative inefficiency. The centralized model improved coordination, speed, and responsibility attribution, yet requires robust transparency mechanisms to prevent personalistic governance and to protect adjudicative independence. The study concludes that an optimal institutional arrangement lies not in reverting to a collective structure nor in unqualified centralization, but in combining centralized administrative leadership with strong safeguards for judicial independence and data-driven accountability. Such a framework aligns with both constitutional principles and the normative concept of trusteeship (amanah) in Islamic governance, ensuring that judicial authority remains both independent in judgment and accountable in administration.     https://www.rahyaftjournal.ir/article_238014.html Islamic management, which fundamentally refers to the administration of an Islamic society based on Islamic teachings and guidelines, is repeatedly emphasized in the Holy Quran, particularly through the narratives of past prophets. Imam Khomeini, as one of the contemporary role models who acted according to Quranic teachings, certainly strived to align his conduct and approach during the Islamic Revolution with these Quranic foundations. This study aims to establish a direct correspondence between Imam Khomeini’s practical conduct during the Islamic Revolution and the management principles outlined in the verses of the Quran, particularly in the stories (قصص) contained within it. The abundance of these narratives and their explicit references highlight their applicability in societal administration. In this research, after reviewing Imam Khomeini’s social statements and decisions, we examined their compatibility with the management principles present in the Quran. We reached the conclusion that most Quranic narratives inherently teach principles, foundations, and strategies for societal governance, and the practical application of these principles is evident in the revolutionary actions of Imam Khomeini. IntroductionCivil Responsibility During the Islamic Revolution Led by Imam Khomeini, considering his spiritual personality and complete mastery of the Quran and its interpretations, it was expected that the behavior and performance of the Imam would also be based on Islamic management. With a little care and consistency between this behavior and the verses containing the principles of Islamic management, we can understand that that expectation was rightly met and Imam Khomeini's managerial behaviors during the Islamic Revolution were completely consistent with the principles of Islamic management.God Almighty is in charge of the management and planning of all the worlds, and therefore we call God the planner of affairs. Management is one of the necessities of the world, and the affairs of our servants and the evolutionary process of society must also have successful management in order to progress through the steps of evolution. Therefore, if a society has successful management, the effects of progress are evident in it, and this is exactly the path that is evident during the revolution led and managed by Imam Khomeini.Any manager like Imam Khomeini who wants to manage a society based on Islamic management depends on a set of wisdoms derived from religion. The necessity of addressing the subject of this research becomes more obvious when we know that by matching the managerial behavior of an Islamic manager like Imam Khomeini in the process of the Islamic Revolution with Islamic management models, we can find an appropriate answer to the questions raised about the position of religion for managing society; first, is it possible to manage society using Islamic themes in the theoretical field? And second, how practical are Islamic teachings for the practical management of society? And third, how much did Imam Khomeini's character and statements align with these principles? The Holy Quran has stated a part of the story of the prophets that is consistent with its guiding purpose. In these verses, it repeatedly presents the character of the prophets in brief or in detail as a presentation of management models. Examining and matching Imam Khomeini's managerial character with these verses illuminates the effectiveness of this management from the pure source of Islam, namely the Holy Quran. Research MethodIn this study, verses related to Islamic management contained in the first ten chapters, which are mainly contained in the stories of the Quran, were extracted, and then the practical life and statements of Imam Khomeini during the Islamic Revolution were examined as a model for implementing those management principles. The verses of the Holy Quran were studied and examined along with Tafsir al-Mizan and some other authoritative interpretations, and after extracting the verses related to the research problem, in the second step, based on the content analysis method, we explored the themes in Imam Khomeini's statements that were related to the management of society, based on the findings of the first step. After the coding stage, the final pattern of content analysis, dimensions, and components of Islamic management were determined. To determine the reliability of this research, after each coding stage, the codes identified in two time intervals were compared with the initial statements. Peer review was also used to verify the validity of this research. In this research, two problem-oriented reflection strategies (the stage of approaching the Quran and discovering Quranic concepts related to the topic) and the content analysis method (the stage of discovering and extracting themes) were used. Conclusion and presentation of patternsIn examining the verses of the stories in the first 10 parts of the Quran, broad basic concepts related to management are seen; analyzing the content of the mentioned verses and referring to the valid interpretations that are stated under these verses and examining the statements of Imam Khomeini during the Islamic Revolution leads us to the following conclusions and patternsIn the theoretical field: Managing society with Islamic themes is possible and requires assumptions, some of which provide a new model for Islamic management of societies include: the appointment of a manager in an Islamic society must be based on science; environmental awareness of the manager reduces corruption in management; management must be against oppression.In the practical field; also, using the teachings in the verses of the stories and their content leads to achieving patterns, including: seriousness in orders and obedience; organization; division of labor and organization among subordinates is one of the important manifestations of the practical field of management; encouraging and punishing subordinates while maintaining the principle of mercy and kindness; Not being far from the heart of society and the set of subordinate forces.As the analysis of the content of the verses and the correspondence of Imam Khomeini's practical conduct with them showed us, there are points, words and references in each of these categories of verses of the stories of the first 10 parts of the Quran that demonstrate the role model of the behavior of past prophets for believers like Imam Khomeini who want to manage society. These points, through indirect teaching, remind the audience of the rules of society management, both in the theoretical and practical and executive dimensions. Therefore, we can conclude that the Quran, by presenting models of society management in the context of the stories of the prophets, has taught society managers that Islamic society management is feasible both from a theoretical and theoretical perspective, and that implementing and operationalizing the commands of Islam in the field of society management leads to the correct management of society. We clearly see the implementation of these principles and their operationalization in the conduct and statements of Imam Khomeini during the establishment of the Islamic Revolution and also during the years of his supreme leadership over the Islamic society of Iran.   https://www.rahyaftjournal.ir/article_238015.html This article examines the role and performance of political elites in the governments of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in the process of political development in Iran, with particular attention to agency–structure constraints. Using a descriptive–analytical approach and relying on documentary and library-based sources, the study seeks to explain how political elites contributed to or hindered political development during these two administrations. The main research question asks how the role and performance of political elites in the Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad governments can be explained in relation to political development. The study hypothesizes that the two administrations differed significantly in their development strategies, institutional approaches, and the behavioral and value-oriented dimensions of elite political culture. The findings indicate that while the Rafsanjani government prioritized economic reconstruction and institutional adjustment after the war, limited elite consensus and insufficient institutionalization of political participation constrained political development. In contrast, the Ahmadinejad government emphasized distributive justice and populist policies, which weakened institutional coherence and further restricted political development. Overall, persistent disagreements among political elites over core concepts such as democracy, participation, political competition, and elite circulation are identified as major obstacles to political development in Iran.   IntroductionPolitical development in Iran has long been a contested and unresolved issue, deeply embedded in the country’s historical experience, political thought, and patterns of elite behavior. From the Constitutional Revolution to the post-revolutionary period, successive political systems and dominant discourses have attempted to address the problem of development, yet the persistence of this debate indicates enduring structural and agential challenges. In contexts where civil society is weak and institutionalized participation is limited, political elites assume a decisive role in shaping development trajectories. Their decisions, values, and strategies can either facilitate institutional transformation or reinforce existing constraints. This article focuses on the role of political elites in two contrasting periods of the Islamic Republic of Iran: the governments of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (Fifth and Sixth Administrations) and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (Ninth and Tenth Administrations). These two cases represent distinct political discourses and development strategies, offering a valuable comparative framework for analyzing elite agency and structural constraints in political development.   Materials and Methods The study adopts a qualitative descriptive–analytical methodology grounded in documentary analysis. Primary sources include official speeches, policy documents, development programs, and public statements of political elites during the two administrations. Secondary sources consist of academic books, peer-reviewed articles, and theoretical works on political development, elite theory, and structuration theory. The analytical framework is informed by Anthony Giddens’ theory of structuration, which conceptualizes political development as the outcome of a dialectical interaction between agency and structure. This framework enables the analysis to move beyond deterministic explanations and to examine how elite actions both shape and are shaped by institutional and cultural structures over time.   DiscussionThe analysis shows that in the Rafsanjani era, political elites prioritized economic reconstruction and post-war stabilization. Structural adjustment policies, privatization, and bureaucratic strengthening were central to the government’s agenda. These policies contributed to infrastructural development, the expansion of a new urban middle class, and certain institutional changes. However, political development remained secondary to economic goals. Limited attention to political participation, weak institutionalization of parties, and insufficient elite consensus on democratic norms constrained the development of political institutions. From a structuration perspective, while elites exercised agency to reform economic structures, they underestimated the unintended consequences of neglecting political and cultural dimensions, resulting in fragile institutionalization and limited societal internalization of political change. In contrast, the Ahmadinejad administration marked a significant shift in elite agency. The dominant discourse emphasized social justice, redistribution, and opposition to technocratic and reformist elites. Development was framed in populist and ideological terms rather than institutional or procedural ones. This approach led to policies such as cash subsidies, housing programs, and extensive state intervention in the economy. However, the marginalization of established institutions, the weakening of expert-driven policymaking, and persistent conflicts with other branches of government undermined institutional coherence. Elite circulation became increasingly restricted, and political competition was narrowed. From the perspective of elite theory, this period exhibited characteristics of elite closure and reduced institutional accountability, which further weakened political development. Comparatively, both administrations faced common structural constraints, including centralized power, rentier economic features, and limited autonomy of civil society. Yet the quality of elite agency differed significantly. The Rafsanjani government demonstrated a form of technocratic agency aimed at structural reform but lacked a comprehensive political development vision. The Ahmadinejad government, by contrast, displayed a voluntaristic and populist agency that disrupted institutional continuity and weakened elite consensus. In both cases, disagreements among elites over fundamental concepts such as democracy, participation, political competition, and the role of institutions emerged as key obstacles to political development.   ConclusionThe study concludes that political development in Iran cannot be achieved solely through economic reform or populist redistribution. It requires a balanced interaction between elite agency and institutional structures, supported by elite consensus, inclusive political institutions, and a participatory political culture. The comparative analysis of the Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad administrations demonstrates that both technocratic neglect of political development and populist erosion of institutions hinder sustainable political development. Without reforms that simultaneously address elite behavior, institutional design, and societal participation, political development in Iran will remain fragmented and vulnerable to recurring cycles of stagnation and conflict. https://www.rahyaftjournal.ir/article_238024.html Landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) remain among the most persistent threats to human security, public health, and sustainable development in Iran’s post-war regions, particularly in the western and southwestern border provinces. This article examines the legal, institutional, and human rights dimensions of landmine contamination in Iran and analyzes the obligations of the Islamic Republic of Iran toward the fundamental rights of affected populations within the framework of public law and international human rights. The central research question asks how landmines have impacted the fundamental rights of victims in Iran and what legal obligations the Iranian state bears in addressing these consequences. The study hypothesizes that mine action constitutes not only a humanitarian necessity but also a binding legal obligation derived from constitutional principles, international human rights treaties, and customary international law, regardless of Iran’s non-accession to certain mine-related conventions. Employing a descriptive–analytical methodology based on legal documents, international reports, and empirical studies, the findings reveal significant physical, psychological, socio-economic, and environmental harms, alongside notable legal and institutional gaps in victim assistance, mine clearance, and governmental accountability.IntroductionLandmines and explosive remnants of war represent one of the most enduring legacies of armed conflict, posing long-term threats to civilian populations long after hostilities have ceased. Unlike conventional weapons whose effects are temporally limited, landmines remain active for decades, continuing to cause death, injury, displacement, and socio-economic disruption. In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the eight-year Iran–Iraq War left vast areas of the western and southwestern border regions contaminated with landmines, a condition that continues to affect provinces such as Ilam, Kermanshah, Khuzestan, Kurdistan, and West Azerbaijan. These remnants of war have generated sustained violations of fundamental rights, including the rights to life, health, security, livelihood, and a healthy environment. This article seeks to situate mine action within the broader framework of public law and human rights, arguing that state responsibility extends beyond technical clearance operations to encompass comprehensive legal and institutional obligations toward affected populations.Materials and MethodsThe study adopts a descriptive–analytical legal methodology. Primary sources include the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, relevant domestic laws, and international legal instruments such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Secondary sources consist of scholarly legal analyses, reports by international organizations such as the ICRC, UNMAS, GICHD, and Landmine Monitor, as well as empirical public health studies conducted in mine-affected Iranian provinces. The analytical framework is grounded in the tripartite typology of state obligations—respect, protect, and fulfill—which allows for a systematic assessment of Iran’s duties in relation to landmine contamination and its consequences.DiscussionThe findings demonstrate that landmine contamination in Iran produces multifaceted harms. Beyond immediate physical injuries and fatalities, landmines generate long-term psychological trauma, economic deprivation, forced migration, and environmental degradation. These impacts directly implicate constitutionally protected rights, including the right to life and security (Article 22), the right to health and social security (Article 29), and the right to a healthy environment (Article 50). From a human rights perspective, the continued presence of landmines constitutes a structural threat to human dignity and equality, disproportionately affecting marginalized border communities.Although Iran has not acceded to the Ottawa Convention banning anti-personnel mines, the analysis shows that this non-accession does not absolve the state of legal responsibility. Customary international humanitarian law, together with binding human rights treaties ratified by Iran, imposes obligations to prevent foreseeable threats to life, provide medical care and rehabilitation to victims, and adopt positive measures to ensure public safety. The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities further reinforces the duty to provide comprehensive rehabilitation, social inclusion, and access to justice for landmine survivors.Institutionally, the study identifies significant shortcomings. While bodies such as the Iran Mine Action Center and various military and civilian agencies are involved in clearance and risk management, the absence of a comprehensive national mine action law has resulted in fragmented governance, limited transparency, and weak accountability mechanisms. Victim assistance remains dispersed across multiple institutions without an integrated framework for compensation, rehabilitation, and social reintegration. Moreover, limited engagement with civil society and international mine action actors has constrained access to technical expertise and external oversight.ConclusionThis research concludes that mine action in Iran must be understood as a core obligation of public law rather than a discretionary humanitarian activity. The Iranian state bears a duty to respect fundamental rights by avoiding policies that perpetuate landmine risks, to protect citizens by regulating and supervising all actors involved in mine clearance and development activities, and to fulfill rights through proactive measures such as systematic clearance, victim assistance, public education, and environmental rehabilitation. Addressing existing legal and institutional gaps requires the adoption of a comprehensive national mine action law, the establishment of independent and transparent oversight mechanisms, enhanced access to justice and compensation for victims, and consideration of accession to relevant international conventions. Only through a rights-based, accountable, and integrated approach can Iran effectively mitigate the long-term human and social costs of landmines and uphold the dignity and security of affected populations. https://www.rahyaftjournal.ir/article_238025.html The Constitutional Revolution era is considered a pivotal period in the history of intellectual and political transformations in Iran. The discourse surrounding the revolution emerged from the intersection of intellectual and religious reformist approaches, with concepts such as law and freedom becoming arenas for contestation and dialogue between these movements. In this context, Mirza Fath Ali Akhundzadeh, as a secular intellectual, and Sheikh Mohammad Ismail Mahallati, as a religious reformist, adopted distinct and influential approaches to engage with modernity and its requirements. This study, utilizing Habermas's framework and the distinction between "instrumental rationality" and "communicative rationality," offers a comparative analysis of rationality in the thought of these two thinkers. The findings indicate that Akhundzadeh, relying on instrumental rationality, viewed the establishment of secularism as a prerequisite for modernity, whereas Mahallati, with an approach based on communicative rationality, sought to shape the legitimacy of the constitutional system through rational interaction between social actors and religious teachings. Despite differences in epistemological foundations, both thinkers shared common goals, such as opposing despotism, defending the rule of law, and striving for social justice. This comparative study provides a clearer picture of the relationship between religion and modernity in Iran during the Constitutional Revolution era.   Introduction In the years leading up to the Constitutional Revolution, Iranian society faced significant intellectual, political, and social crises. The Qajar monarchy's authoritarian structure, the decline of traditional order, widespread public dissatisfaction, and the encounter with Western modernity pushed Iranian intellectuals to seek solutions for change. Three main intellectual currents emerged: one focused on modern rationality and rejected religious tradition, a second sought to reject modernity with a fundamentalist view, and the third aimed to reinterpret religion to address modern challenges. This study focuses on the first and third currents. Two key figures, Mirza Fath Ali Akhundzadeh, a secular intellectual, and Sheikh Mohammad Ismail Mahallati, a religious reformist, will be analyzed. A comparative study of their ideas helps uncover the roots of the intellectual divide between religion and modernity and the development of both secular and religious intellectualism. Understanding the political and religious thoughts of this era is crucial for analyzing contemporary Iran's identity transformations. Additionally, analyzing the views of these two thinkers may offer insights into revisiting modern reformist and intellectual discourses. Given the ongoing tension between religious tradition and modern reason, the historical and epistemological understanding of their intellectual legacies is particularly important. The central question of this research is: How can religious and secular rationality be understood in the political thought of Mahallati and Akhundzadeh?   Materials and Methods Based on Habermas's distinction between instrumental rationality and communicative rationality, two distinct approaches to religion and politics can be observed in the thoughts of Akhundzadeh and Mahallati. Akhundzadeh, as a secular intellectual, embraced instrumental rationality and viewed religion as a barrier to societal progress. He believed that religion should be separated from politics and that changes in cultural tools, such as writing and education, were necessary for progress. In contrast, Mahallati, as a constitutionalist cleric, emphasized communicative rationality and sought to reinterpret modern concepts within religious teachings to legitimize the Constitutional Revolution through dialogue and consensus between religion and modernity. Thus, these two thinkers represent two different paths in confronting modernity in Iran.   Discussion In comparing Habermas's theoretical framework with the thoughts of Akhundzadeh and Mahallati, significant differences are observed in their perspectives on religion, law, tradition, and ultimate goals. Habermas highlights the dual role of religion, which can be both a threat and a positive source. For Akhundzadeh, religion and traditional superstitions are seen as obstacles to modernizing society, whereas Mahallati views religion as complementing communicative rationality, providing moral and normative legitimacy to laws and institutions. Regarding law, Akhundzadeh advocates for a secular law based on Western models, while Mahallati believes that law should emerge from public dialogue and consensus, with religious teachings integrated only when expressed in rational terms. In dealing with tradition, Akhundzadeh sees it as a hindrance to progress, while Mahallati emphasizes correcting misinterpretations of tradition and utilizing its inner capacities to combat despotism. Akhundzadeh's ultimate goal is the modernization of Iran, while Mahallati aims to legitimize the constitutional revolution and create an ideal system through rational consensus.   Conclusion In confronting modernity during the Constitutional Revolution, two distinct approaches emerged: Akhundzadeh's secularism and Mahallati's religious reformism. Akhundzadeh, with instrumental rationality, radically criticized religion and tradition, viewing them as obstacles to progress. He sought modernization and efficiency by modeling Iran after the West. In contrast, Mahallati, using communicative rationality, tried to reinterpret modern concepts within the framework of religion, aiming to legitimize the Constitutional Revolution through dialogue and consensus. While these approaches differed in methods and epistemological foundations, they shared the ultimate goal of combating despotism and establishing the rule of law. A comparative analysis of these two rationalities shows that Akhundzadeh's instrumental rationality failed to gain a broad social base, while Mahallati's communicative rationality, though successful in creating consensus, could not evolve into a dialogue-based democracy.     https://www.rahyaftjournal.ir/article_238026.html This article examines the principle of judicial impartiality at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) through an analysis of the case brought by the Islamic Republic of Iran against the United States concerning violations of Iran’s airspace, maritime rights, and economic interests under the 1955 Treaty of Amity. The central research question asks whether the ICJ adhered to the standards of judicial impartiality in its handling of provisional measures (2018) and its final judgment on jurisdiction and merits (2023). The study hypothesizes that structural characteristics of the Court, including the consent-based nature of jurisdiction, the presence of ad hoc judges, and geopolitical pressures exerted by major powers, have influenced the Court’s reasoning and limited its impartial performance. Using a qualitative and analytical legal method, the article draws on ICJ judgments, separate and dissenting opinions, treaty interpretation, and scholarly critiques. The findings indicate that while the Court formally upheld procedural neutrality, its restrictive interpretation of treaty jurisdiction and selective engagement with Iran’s claims raised serious concerns regarding substantive impartiality and the legitimacy of international adjudication.   IntroductionJudicial impartiality constitutes a foundational pillar of international adjudication and a core element of the legitimacy of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. Impartiality in this context extends beyond the personal neutrality of judges and encompasses structural, procedural, and institutional dimensions, including judicial selection, jurisdictional doctrines, and interpretive practices. The credibility of the ICJ, and the willingness of states to accept its judgments, depend significantly on the perception that the Court applies international law consistently and without political bias. This issue becomes particularly salient in disputes involving major powers. The case initiated by the Islamic Republic of Iran against the United States under the 1955 Treaty of Amity, following the reimposition of U.S. sanctions in 2018, provides a critical opportunity to assess the Court’s impartiality in practice.   Materials and Methods This research adopts a qualitative and analytical legal methodology. Primary sources include ICJ judgments and orders issued in 2018 and 2023, separate and dissenting opinions of judges, and official documents related to the Treaty of Amity and relevant United Nations resolutions. Secondary sources consist of scholarly works on judicial impartiality, legitimacy, and the political dimensions of international adjudication. The analysis is informed by theoretical frameworks of procedural justice and legitimacy, particularly those advanced by Thomas Franck and critical international legal scholars such as Martti Koskenniemi. The study employs doctrinal analysis to evaluate treaty interpretation and jurisdictional reasoning, alongside a comparative approach that situates the Iran–United States case within the broader jurisprudence of the ICJ, including cases such as Nicaragua v. United States.   DiscussionThe findings reveal a complex and ambivalent pattern in the Court’s approach. On the one hand, the ICJ affirmed its jurisdiction under the Treaty of Amity and issued provisional measures in 2018 requiring the United States to ensure humanitarian trade and aviation safety. This decision was widely viewed as an affirmation of Iran’s legal position and an indication of the Court’s willingness to constrain unilateral power. On the other hand, the Court’s 2023 judgment adopted a notably restrictive interpretation of treaty provisions, excluding significant aspects of Iran’s claims—particularly those related to banking sanctions, oil trade, and broader economic measures—from substantive review. This narrow interpretive approach contrasts with earlier ICJ jurisprudence, most notably in the Nicaragua case, where the Court relied extensively on customary international law and general principles rather than confining itself to treaty text alone. The presence of ad hoc judges and the voting patterns observed in the Iran–United States case further fuel concerns about structural bias, as empirical studies have shown a strong tendency for ad hoc judges to support the appointing state. Additionally, the Court’s reluctance to engage with broader principles of state responsibility and proportionality suggests a form of “judicial restraint” that may function as de facto partiality when powerful states are involved.   ConclusionThe analysis demonstrates that while the ICJ formally adhered to procedural requirements of neutrality, its substantive approach in the Iran–United States case raises serious questions about judicial impartiality. Structural constraints—such as consent-based jurisdiction, lack of enforcement mechanisms, and geopolitical pressures—significantly limit the Court’s capacity to act as an independent arbiter of international justice. The Court’s cautious and restrictive reasoning, particularly in the 2023 judgment, undermines perceptions of equality before the law and weakens the legitimacy of international adjudication. Strengthening judicial impartiality at the ICJ requires not only doctrinal refinement but also institutional reforms aimed at enhancing transparency, consistency, and independence from political influence.   https://www.rahyaftjournal.ir/article_214291.html Therefore, the following article, with the aim of examining this agreement, seeks to answer the question, what regional consequences will the Ibrahim agreement have on the national security of the Islamic Republic of Iran? The findings of the article, which were collected using the theoretical framework of Stephen Walt's defensive realism (threat balance theory) and using the analytical-descriptive method, show that this agreement has several consequences in the regional dimension, such as: lack of The formation of a regime and stable security arrangements in the Middle East, the proximity of the Zionist regime to the security borders of Iran, The opening of different fronts around Iran, the challenge of Iran's nuclear program, the erosion of regional countries and especially Iran in order to prevent it from becoming a regional power, the strengthening of the weapons capabilities of Arab countries, especially the United Arab Emirates. The balance of weapons in the region and the disintegration of the regional power balance structure have resulted, which can challenge the national security of Iran in the economic, military, political, social, cultural and environmental fields. Although, it can have positive consequences for the Islamic Republic of Iran. https://www.rahyaftjournal.ir/article_214693.html The current research aims to study "prediction and prevention of drug crimes based on data mining knowledge". From this point of view, after expanding the conceptual space of the subject, a quantitative research strategy of the secondary analysis type has been used in such a way that with Having a check list or a reverse questionnaire tool has been collected from 1885 cases of criminal cases in the execution of sentences in Shahryar city and has been subjected to descriptive and inferential analysis to validate the research tool using qualitative content validity. and also used the reliability coefficient for the reliability measurement and its value is estimated to be 8 tenths. The findings of the research show that among the types of algorithms used, the random forest algorithm is the most and most accurate algorithm in data classification. In addition, drug crimes have been more influenced by gender, which shows a significant difference between men and women. https://www.rahyaftjournal.ir/article_216634.html . Among the internal elements, the ideology of the critics is emphasized, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is emphasized among the activists. During this period, while criticizing the foreign policy of the previous government, a new foreign policy was introduced in the framework of constructive interaction with the world under the title of moderation discourse, the culmination of which should be seen in the JCPOA. However, in addition to opportunities, the new approach in Rouhani's foreign policy also created great challenges. The main question of this article is: How have internal components and activists influenced the foreign policy of the Rouhani government in the JCPOA issue? According to the hypothesis that follows this question, the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in advancing the JCPOA on the one hand and the role of the ideological groups criticizing and opposing the government on the other hand have played an interactive role in the JCPOA issue. According to the results of the research, Rouhani's foreign policy, which was accompanied by success and then many problems, has been affected by the aforementioned factors in various ways. https://www.rahyaftjournal.ir/article_226350.html The main goal of the research is to analyze the points of commonality and difference between these two thinkers in explaining the foundations of political legitimacy and the relationship between religion and politics. The central question of the research is how Na'ini and Locke, each in different epistemological and social contexts, have addressed the concept of legitimacy of power and what differences exist in their perception of the role of religion and the people in political sovereignty. The research hypothesis is based on the fact that despite the fundamental difference in the relationship between religion and politics, both thinkers share an emphasis on limiting the power of the ruler and the right of the people to monitor and resist. The research method is qualitative-analytical and based on the conceptual analysis of primary and secondary sources. The results of the research show that Naini, with his religious interpretation of constitutional government and his emphasis on justice and popular oversight, and Locke, with his theory of natural rights and social contract, both have moved towards restricting power and guaranteeing public freedoms, although their epistemological foundations and relationship to religion are different. https://www.rahyaftjournal.ir/article_229787.html This study aims to examine scientific diplomacy as the axis of the future soft power of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The central research question is: How can scientific diplomacy become the main axis of Iran’s soft power at the regional level, and what scenarios can be outlined for its future? The hypothesis assumes that by combining Iran’s scientific and technological capacities with cultural and regional mechanisms, scientific diplomacy can enhance the country’s position in the architecture of soft power. The research employs a qualitative and futures-oriented methodology, using trend analysis and James Dator’s scenario planning model to outline alternative futures. Findings indicate four possible scenarios: continuous growth, collapse, re-creation, and fundamental transformation. The preferred scenario is a combination of continuous growth and re-creation, reinforced by strategic investment in emerging technologies. This scenario is expected to increase regional legitimacy, create positive scientific dependencies, and consolidate Iran’s role in the architecture of regional soft power. https://www.rahyaftjournal.ir/article_232928.html The aim of this article is to examine the performance and role of the political elites of the Hashemi Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad governments in the process of political development and its agency-structural obstacles. The research method was descriptive-analytical and made use of library resources. In response to the question of what was the performance and role of the political elites in the process of political development of the Hashemi Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad governments? The results showed that in analyzing the agency-structural approach to economic policies, it can be stated that the Hashemi Rafsanjani government considered adjustment policies in the structural area of ​​the economy. After that, the Ahmadinejad government came to power from the same context that the previous governments had created and, in order to establish justice in society, implemented plans that were more in favor of the lower strata of society, which included the development of populist aspects of the government, the dominance of militarism in the government, and the disintegration of the government. The disagreement of elites over the principles and generalities of political development and their different definitions of some principles and foundations, such as national interests, are considered democracy. https://www.rahyaftjournal.ir/article_232931.html This study aims to examine scientific diplomacy as the axis of the future soft power of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The central research question is: How can scientific diplomacy become the main axis of Iran’s soft power at the regional level, and what scenarios can be outlined for its future? The hypothesis assumes that by combining Iran’s scientific and technological capacities with cultural and regional mechanisms, scientific diplomacy can enhance the country’s position in the architecture of soft power. The research employs a qualitative and futures-oriented methodology, using trend analysis and James Dator’s scenario planning model to outline alternative futures. Findings indicate four possible scenarios: continuous growth, collapse, re-creation, and fundamental transformation. The preferred scenario is a combination of continuous growth and re-creation, reinforced by strategic investment in emerging technologies. This scenario is expected to increase regional legitimacy, create positive scientific dependencies, and consolidate Iran’s role in the architecture of regional soft power.