In recent years, global decarbonization policy has evolved from an environmental initiative into a regulatory framework shaping international trade. Through instruments such as the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, production standards, and carbon pricing systems, climate policies now directly influence market access, competitiveness, and global value chains. This study examines how this institutional transformation contributes to the reproduction of inequality in international trade and how Iran is positioned within the emerging low-carbon trade order. The main hypothesis argues that due to asymmetric institutional, technological, and data-related capacities among countries, decarbonization does not necessarily reduce existing inequalities but may instead intensify them, placing Iran in a structurally marginalized position. Using a qualitative methodology based on document analysis, legal-institutional examination, and secondary international data, the findings indicate that Iran’s energy-intensive economic structure, lack of binding climate commitments, and institutional constraints significantly limit its adaptive capacity. Consequently, Iran’s future trajectories are shaped more by structural limitations than by voluntary policy choices.

Introduction
Global climate governance has undergone a profound transformation in recent decades. What initially emerged as a set of voluntary environmental commitments has gradually developed into a complex regulatory regime with far-reaching economic implications. Decarbonization policies are no longer confined to domestic energy or environmental sectors; instead, they increasingly shape international trade rules, industrial strategies, and market access conditions. Instruments such as carbon pricing mechanisms, emission trading systems, sustainability standards, and carbon border measures have integrated climate objectives into the architecture of global trade. As a result, climate policy has become a key factor in determining competitiveness and participation in global value chains. While this transformation is often presented as a necessary response to climate change, its distributive consequences remain highly uneven. Countries with advanced technological capabilities, strong institutions, and regulatory influence are better positioned to adapt and benefit from this transition. In contrast, energy-dependent and institutionally constrained economies face disproportionate adjustment costs. Iran represents a critical case in this context, as it combines high carbon intensity, limited access to rule-making processes, and restricted institutional capacity. This study addresses the following central question: How does global decarbonization contribute to the reproduction of inequality in international trade, and how is Iran positioned within this emerging order?
Materials and Methods
This research adopts a qualitative and interdisciplinary methodological framework combining political economy, international law, and institutional analysis. First, a systematic document analysis was conducted, including international treaties, policy reports, regulatory frameworks, and institutional guidelines related to climate governance and trade. Key sources include documents from the European Union, the World Trade Organization, the OECD, the UNFCCC, and international energy agencies. Second, a legal-institutional analysis was employed to examine how climate-related trade instruments are embedded within existing trade regimes. Particular attention was paid to mechanisms such as the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, environmental exceptions in WTO law, and technical barriers to trade. Third, secondary quantitative data from internationally recognized databases, such as Our World in Data, WITS, and UN Comtrade, were used to contextualize Iran’s trade structure, emission profile, and market dependence. Finally, scenario analysis was applied to explore possible future trajectories for Iran under different institutional and policy conditions. This approach allowed the study to assess structural constraints and strategic options without relying on speculative forecasting.
Discussion
The findings reveal that global decarbonization operates as a form of regulatory power that restructures international competition. Rather than functioning solely as an environmental instrument, climate policy increasingly serves as a mechanism for market governance and industrial positioning. Advanced economies have integrated climate objectives into broader strategies of industrial modernization and strategic autonomy. Through standard-setting, technological leadership, and regulatory diffusion, they externalize their domestic policy priorities onto global markets. This process reinforces their competitive advantage and limits the policy space of less-developed economies.For Iran, these dynamics create multiple layers of vulnerability. Its economy remains heavily dependent on fossil fuels, energy-intensive industries, and carbon-intensive exports. At the same time, Iran lacks binding commitments under the Paris Agreement and faces constraints in data reporting, regulatory alignment, and institutional coordination. These structural conditions restrict Iran’s ability to comply with emerging standards and to challenge potentially discriminatory measures through legal channels. As a result, instruments such as CBAM function not only as climate tools but also as de facto trade barriers. The scenario analysis indicates that Iran’s future position will largely depend on structural reforms rather than short-term policy adjustments. Passive adaptation leads to deeper marginalization, while limited technical compliance only delays structural exclusion. Meaningful repositioning requires coordinated industrial, trade, and climate strategies, which remain institutionally challenging.
Conclusion
This study demonstrates that global decarbonization has become a central component of the contemporary trade order. Far from being neutral or universally beneficial, climate-related trade regulations reflect and reinforce existing power asymmetries. The Iranian case illustrates how structural constraints, institutional limitations, and asymmetric rule-making capacities contribute to the reproduction of inequality. Decarbonization, in this context, functions as both an environmental and a political-economic process.
Understanding this dual character is essential for designing effective national responses and for developing more equitable global governance mechanisms. Without addressing institutional disparities, the transition to a low-carbon economy risks deepening global trade inequalities rather than mitigating them.