The present study is devoted to examining the process of institution building and good governance in the governance system of the Islamic Republic in post-revolutionary governments. It is believed that the Islamic Revolution, with its expansionist goals and institutional capacities, could have achieved an open society and good governance. While the method of institution building and governance structures in the Islamic Republic progressed slowly. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to answer the question of how the institution building process in post-revolutionary governments has progressed in terms of achieving good governance. The hypothesis is that this process of institutional organization in post-revolutionary governments within the framework of a limited access system created three types of orders: fragile, basic, and immature. In the first stage of institutionalization, the institutional and structural power of the religious coalition was established in the creation of revolutionary-religious and quasi-state institutions as a step of limited institutional development. In the second stage, developmental institutions were established that were not sustainable and inclusive, and even if they remained in the governance structure, they had functional weaknesses and did not have the ability to transition and access indicators of good governance and sustainable development. The present article, based on the views of new institutionalists, especially Douglas North, and the theories of good governance, has used the qualitative method of document analysis and library resources.
 
Introduction
More than four and a half decades have passed since the Islamic Republic was established. During these years, the governance system has faced ups and downs in the process of institution building and governance style. In the early days of the Islamic Republic, disagreements over the nature of post-revolutionary institutions and governance style between different movements and groups increased. On the other hand, events such as the assassination of revolutionary leaders, internal rebellions, imposed war, and the capture of the US embassy pushed the political stability of the Islamic Republic towards violence and created a fragile social order that at every moment confronted the fledgling political system with new and unpleasant events that warned of the risk of overthrow and collapse. Religious and non-religious movements and groups in the fragile political order were divided and fragmented. Each movement and group, according to its political views and beliefs, attempted to form coalitions and organize its affiliated forces, and in the meantime, the religious institution, led by the clergy, was able to successfully form coalitions and create a basic order. In fact, the dialectic between the religious and the non-religious ultimately led to the victory of the religious and the clergy.
The process of forming the institutional structure and governance by the religious movement developed the exclusive basic order. With the split and division that occurred in the second decade of the revolution among the ruling movement, namely the clerical institution, states were established that were on the verge of developing a mature order in terms of institutional nature and governance style, but they regressed to a basic order and even advanced to the point of fragility and created undesirable conditions in the governance system. Therefore, the purpose of this research is to answer the question of how the process of institution-building in post-revolutionary states has progressed in terms of achieving good governance. On this basis, the process of forming a limited access system based on three fragile, basic, and mature orders in the governance system of the Islamic Republic of Iran in terms of access to good governance is explained and interpreted. Therefore, the necessity of this research is to help the policy-making apparatus in reforming, strengthening, and consolidating the institutions necessary for the realization of good governance in the Islamic Republic.
Research Method
This research is a qualitative research that uses documentary analysis to examine the processes of formation of good governance in the Islamic Republic of Iran. In this research, library resources, including documents, books, articles, and academic theses, were used to collect information.
Theoretical Framework
North's Institutionalization Theory
North defines institutions as the rules of the game, the constraints and limitations imposed by humans in political, economic and social relations and exchanges among humans. By presenting the theory of "social order", he described the ruling order in developing societies as a limited access order and in developed societies as an open access order, where institutions are personal and exclusive in limited societies but impersonal in open societies. According to North, the stages of institutional development and the way of governance in limited societies have three orders: fragile, basic and mature. North says that the political system in developing societies controls violence by creating rents, so that powerful individuals and groups avoid violence for their own interests and calls this way of organizing society a limited access system. Powerful elites in a dominant coalition control violence by creating rents by monopolizing and restricting others in the field of political and economic management. The number of organizations is small and largely dependent on the government, the government is highly centralized and non-inclusive, the rules of the game in society are unequal and discriminatory. Economic and political activity is allowed as a personal privilege, not a public right, property rights are not defined and guaranteed, and there is a prevailing sense that there is no public equality. According to North, the fragile order is on the verge of collapse and seeks to create a consensus among the elites to establish minimal peace and tranquility and to survive against violence. In this order, the formation of organizations is based on personal relationships by leaders. While in the basic order, the state means the formal government, which is a set of viable state organizations, and is established. The privileges of the power elite and their organizations are defined in relation to the dominant coalition and the state. The organizational structures of the state are stable, but the state does not support organizations outside the dominant coalition. In this government, the ruling class and others refrain from creating private economic organizations. But the mature order enjoys the support of a dominant coalition due to the wide variety of organizations, but access to private organizations approved and supported by the state is limited. There is a stable institutional structure of the state and a body of public law that specifies functions and provides a way to resolve conflicts. These types of systems face periodic crises and are more resilient to shocks and have greater durability than the fragile and basic spectrum. The mature order has the ability to support a wide range of civil, political, and economic organizations outside the circle of government. The arrangements of the mature order are consistent with the logic of limited government and can provide the basis for the transition to an open access order.
According to North, for development to occur, those in power must cross several paths: coalition or conflict, institutional organization or personal relationships, and productive or unproductive rent. The requirement for proper policymaking is to move the powerful towards coalitions and to organize and distribute productive rents, and every society must find the logic of choosing one of these two paths and strategies for the development path, namely coalitions, institutional organization, and productive rents. Of course, North believes in decisive opportunities and exceptions such as environmental shocks, environmental and international conditions, wars, riots, protests, and diseases in the formation of institutions.
According to North, in the open access order, impersonal governance and universal equality and inclusiveness prevail. In this society, there is a multitude of diverse organizations, decentralized government, impersonal relationships, the rule of law, and a rich civil society. In this order, sustainable economic growth and political development occur due to different working methods in governance.
Good governance is called a democratic government that has sound economic policies that are organized by efficient organizations. Good governance requires reforming policies in the field of government organizations and institutions. Good governance is managed through the interdependence between government components and non-government sectors through the three sectors of government, civil society, and the private sector.
Findings and Conclusion
 The process of institutionalization flourished since the establishment of the Islamic Republic, centered on the Islamist movement. In the 1960s, due to political chaos between political groups and the country's specific conditions resulting from internal rebellions, imposed war, and international pressures, the political order was in a fragile state. In this fragile order, the Islamic Republic Party and the Revolutionary Council organized all religious groups under the title of the dominant coalition of religious figures, and established revolutionary-quasi-religious institutions to maintain the fledgling system through mass mobilization, and established a limited-access order as the ideological basis. During this period, disruptive political competition and a war economy prevailed, which did not fit the logic of good governance. Although the coalition of religious organizations and revolutionary institution-building was a step in institutional development to control violence, governments in the following decades had to turn to institutional-organizational diversity for mature order due to the transition from crises and social peace. Although the beginning of institutional diversity in the economic construction state and in the reform state, most political and civil institutions were under the banner of reform, the reform state placed the reform state on the verge of a mature order. The weakness of the logic of development of reformists and government elites and the resistance of opponents and external factors such as the September 11 incident and calling Iran an axis of evil finally made the transformation and mature order immature. After the immature mature order in the Ahmadinejad government, we witness the elimination of most of the developmental government and civil institutions and the decline of governance indicators compared to the previous government and a kind of return from the immature mature order, and in the moderation state, there is an attempt to return the governance situation to a normal state. So that governance indicators such as the rule of law in the construction state are 32 percent, in the reform state 62 percent, and in the Ahmadinejad period 25 percent, effectiveness in the construction period is evaluated as negative 75 percent, in the reform period negative 49 percent, and in the Ahmadinejad period negative 87 percent. Non-violence against individuals and political accountability during the construction period was negative 47 percent, during the reforms it was negative 79 percent, and during the Ahmadinejad period it was negative 1.28 percent, and accountability against political corruption was -1.53 ​​during the Ahmadinejad period and -1.43 in the moderate government. Political stability in the Ahmadinejad government during the events of 2009 was -1.56, and in the moderate government in the final years it grew negatively. In fact, the process of institutional organization in post-revolutionary governments within the framework of the limited access system created three types of order: fragile, basic, and immature. In the first stage of institutionalization, the institutional and structural power of the religious coalition in creating revolutionary-religious and quasi-state institutions was established as a step of limited institutional development. In the second stage, developmental institutions were established that were not sustainable and inclusive, and even if they remained in the governance structure, they had functional weaknesses and did not have the ability to transition and access indicators of good governance and sustainable development. Therefore, this process, despite the functional differences of the governments, indicates weak governance in Iran. Therefore, good governance requires recognizing the damages and paying attention to successful institution building and institutional quality in the country.